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TO BEGIN A CONVERSATION ON
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE*
THE HONORABLE PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK**
When I was in private practice and won a case, I had little concern
with anything other than the bottom line of the decision. I always
thought the judge or justices were brilliant in those cases. Of course
when I lost, my view of the scholarship of the members of the court was
not so enthusiastic. I did not study trends of the court's decision making
unless I was writing a brief and exploring the edges of a given legal
issue. I imagine that many practicing lawyers are much the same now as
I was then. However, today I am asking you to look beyond the bottom
line of court decisions so that we may begin a conversation on judicial
independence. It is an important consideration to all citizens of
Wisconsin, but it is particularly important to those of us who work in the
judicial branch, on both sides of the bench.
Judicial independence is a highly prized quality, at least according to
the judiciary. The public also values judicial independence, but often as
a more abstract principle. It has been said that most of the respect the
public accords to judicial decisions emanates from public perception
that a court's decision is an independent determination of what the rule
of law requires.
Judicial accountability is also a quality that is widely valued, but it is
most often addressed by those outside of judicial circles. There is a
natural tension between judicial independence and judicial
accountability. I shall attempt a limited exploration of both concepts as
we begin what I hope will be an ongoing conversation.
I. HISTORIC PERCEPTIONS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Judicial independence is a concept that has been around for a long
time. In discussing the principles of our tripartite system of government,
the founding fathers focused on the need for judicial independence. It
was critical to their structuring of the federal government and the
* This speech was presented to the American Constitution Society for Law and Policy,
Milwaukee Chapter, on January 25, 2007.
** Patience Drake Roggensack is a justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
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establishment of the United States Constitution. During the debates
preceding the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the judicial branch
of government was seen as a bulwark against "encroachments and
oppressions of the representative body [Congress]" and as "the best
expedient which can be devised in any government, to secure a steady,
upright, and impartial administration of the laws."' The judiciary was
often referred to as the "least dangerous" branch because it had neither
the purse of the legislative branch nor the sword of the executive
branch.2 Those involved with the debate and creation of the Federal
Constitution were very concerned that an independent judiciary be part
of the structure of the federal government. The separation of powers of
the three branches of government was thought to be central to the
preservation of liberty for the people. As Alexander Hamilton
explained, "'there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated
from the legislative and executive powers.' . . . [L]iberty can have
nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have every thing to
fear from its union with either of the other departments .... ,,3
The founding fathers' concept of an independent judiciary also
expected that the judges would not "substitute their own pleasure to the
constitutional intentions of the legislature."4 Rather, the courts were
expected to interpret the law and not to "exercise WILL instead of
JUDGMENT." 5 The independent quality of the judiciary and the trust in
the courts to exercise "judgment" about what the rule of law requires
and not the "will" of those who serve in the courts remain foundational
principles of judicial independence. The historic acceptance of Marbury
v. Madison,6 where the United States Supreme Court established its
constitutional right to set aside laws that it concluded were
unconstitutional, is grounded in part in the public's trust in an
independent judiciary. For many, myself among them, a judge's
decision counts because he or she is trusted to operate with restraint in
interpreting constitutions and statutes, while employing process that is
even-handedly applied to all who come before the courts.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 491.
4. Id. at 493.
5. Id.
6. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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II. DEFINING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE TODAY
Much of the debate on judicial independence is confused by how
various discussants define the term "judicial independence."7 However,
most agree that as a general concept, judicial independence has two
components: institutional independence and decisional independence.8
When discussing institutional independence, the focus of the discussion
is the judiciary's ability to stand up to other branches of government.9
Institutional independence is sometimes referred to as "external"
independence."
When discussing the decisional component of judicial independence,
the focus is on the individual decision making of each judge or of each
collegial court." The ability of each judge or court to make independent
legal determinations also may be referred to as "internal" judicial
independence.1 2 Both broad concepts are significant to the legitimacy of
the judicial branch of government, and both concepts of judicial
independence are applicable to state as well as federal courts.
The component of institutional independence is essential to our
tripartite system of government. It requires the courts' independence
from the legislative and executive branches. Institutional independence
is most often associated with the separation of powers doctrine, though
in reality both decisional and institutional independence have
separation of powers qualities. Institutional independence cannot be
accorded the judicial branch without the respect of the executive and
legislative branches for judicial decisions. At least one writer has noted,
"[A]n independent judiciary requires also that [its] decisions, once
given, would not be altered or ignored by the government [responsible
for enforcing them]."'3
However, as part of the system of checks and balances created in our
tripartite system of government, there are occasions when it may be
appropriate for the legislature to regulate a matter in an area of
7. Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
315, 317 (1999).
8. A.B.A. COMM'N ON SEPARATION OF POWERS & JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AN
INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY 11-12 (1997).
9. Id. at 12.
10. Id. at 11-12.
11. Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, or:
Why Do We Have an Independent Judiciary?, 13 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 349, 351-52 (1993).
12. Id. at 351.
13. Id. at 352.
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constitutionally shared powers or to overrule the courts in an area of
exclusive legislative authority. For example, the legislature may enact a
statute that affects the functioning of the courts as an institution, as it
did with the statute reviewed in State v. Holmes.14 In Holmes, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed whether Wisconsin Statutes section
971.20, which established the peremptory right of substitution of judges,
was constitutionally permissible."5 Or, the legislature may enact a
statute that effectively overrules prior Supreme Court statutory
interpretation, as it did in regard to the court's interpretation of
conditions relating to recreational immunity. 16
The component of decisional independence is adherence to the rule
of law in individual cases, such that decisions of a court or an individual
judge are not affected by the demands of another branch of government
or by other personal pressures exerted upon judges. 7 Decisional
independence requires impartial decision making, where the rule of law
is applied even-handedly and the court does not respond to external
pressures such as court funding, special interest groups, political
agendas, the press, campaign contributors, or an upcoming election or
hoped-for appointment. 8
In recent years, there have been overt attempts to politicize the
judiciary through questioning in the federal appointment process and
through questioning in state judicial elections. The questioning has
become so detailed in the federal process that at times it appears that
the power of the executive to appoint a justice or judge and the Senate's
power to consent to appointments have become the power-in-fact to
decide significant constitutional issues. In my view, the executive and
legislative attempts to decide constitutional issues through the
appointment process are inconsistent with judicial independence, which
requires both independent decisions and the appearance that the
decisions have been independently made.
However, it is when one begins to examine judicial accountability
that one recognizes some actions of the courts may not have been
judicially independent. For example, when a court disregards long-
14. 106 Wis. 2d 31,41-47, 315 N.W.2d 703,708-11 (1982).
15. Id. at 41, 315 N.W.2d at 708.
16. See Verdoijak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 200 Wis. 2d 624, 633-35, 547 N.W.2d 602,
605-06 (1996).
17. Salzberger, supra note 11, at 351-52.
18. Jason J. Czarnezki, Voting and Electoral Politics in the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 87
MARO. L. REV. 323, 327-30 (2003).
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standing precedent or changes established standards of issue-analysis
without a well-reasoned and fully articulated explanation of why the
changes are required, the judicial independence underlying the decision
should be questioned. Judicial independence is not simply permitting an
individual judge or court to do whatever it wants. This is so because
when the judiciary exercises its will rather than its reasoned judgment, it
acts contrary to the grant of authority from the electorate that expected
an independent judiciary that can be trusted to operate with self-
restraint under ascertainable rules of law.
I should note here that not all jurists view judicial independence in
this fashion. Some very dedicated public servants have concluded that it
is part of their office to implement the policies they believe most
appropriate, even when doing so is contrary to the choice the legislature
has made. It has been said that policy-driven decision making assists the
legislature in writing better laws. 9 I do not share this perspective;
however, it cannot be overlooked in any conversation on judicial
independence.
But be wary, the public perceives judicial independence as
protecting the application of a rule of law that drives the result in each
case, no matter who appears before the court or what policy the rule of
law may advance. Therefore, when judges decide cases based on their
own policy preferences, their actions can be destructive of the public's
perception that the judiciary is an independent decision maker. There
are dangers in undermining the public's perception of how judicial
decision making is accomplished. It can result in the public deciding
that the courts are nothing more than political bodies, and therefore,
public confidence in the courts is not warranted. And finally, accepting
or permitting personal policy preferences to control judicial decision
making, in a worse-case scenario, can result in tyranny of the judiciary-
a judiciary that operates without defined standards or rules, much like
the "Hama rules" of Thomas Friedman's best seller, From Beirut to
Jerusalem.E0 Under Hama rules, the rule was, there are no rules.21
It also is interesting to note the rise of a concept known as the New
Federalism. Under New Federalism, state courts interpret claimed
19. Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators
and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1053-55 (1991).
20. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, FROM BEIRUT TO JERUSALEM (1989).
21. Id. at 76-105.
22. See State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, 84 & n.1, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 84 & n.1, 700 N.W.2d
899, 1 84 & n.1 (Crooks, J., concurring).
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rights and parse the constitutional sufficiency of statutes under state
constitutions. In so doing, courts interpret the words in the state
constitutions differently from the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the same words in parallel clauses of the United States
Constitution.23 When a state court employs New Federalism in its
decisions, it does so with the realization that its decision cannot be
modified by any other governmental body, state or federal.24 This is an
extraordinary exercise of judicial power.
III. ATTEMPTS TO RESTRICT THE COURTS
The history of our country shows that some have not valued judicial
independence and have attempted to curb it. A ready example is
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "court-packing" plan.5 In 1937,
President Roosevelt proposed to add one new justice for every justice
then over seventy years of age. That plan would have given him six
immediate appointments and increased the size of the court from nine
to fifteen justices. President Roosevelt devised "court-packing" because
he believed that the United States Supreme Court was striking down too
many of his "New Deal" legislative initiatives as unconstitutional laws.
By adding six hand-picked Justices to the Court, President Roosevelt
hoped to form a new majority that would look more favorably on his
initiatives.26 The plan failed, but the desire to manipulate the decision
making of courts continues today.
2
For example, the recent decision that upheld the right of Michael
Schiavo, the husband and legal guardian of severely injured Theresa
Marie Schiavo, to terminate Theresa's feeding,* resulted in
Congressman Tom DeLay's suggestion that the judge who decided the
case should be impeached for his decision.29  There also have been
23. Robert M. Howard et al., State Courts, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Protection of
Civil Liberties, 40 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 845, 850-51 (2006).
24. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, 1$ 84-85 and accompanying notes, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 84-85
and accompanying notes, 700 N.W.2d 899, 1$ 84-85 and accompanying notes.
25. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 132-62 (1995).
26. Id.
27. See KENNETH R. THOMAS, LIMITING COURT JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: "COURT-STRIPPING" 1-2 (2005).
28. See Comm. on Gov't Reform of the House of Representatives v. Schiavo, 544 U.S.
916 (2005).
29. Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, Even Death Does Not Quiet Harsh Political
Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at Al.
[91:535
2007] CONVERSATION ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 541
proposals in Congress to restrict the jurisdiction of federal courts so that
certain laws could not be subjected to judicial review. 3
In recent years, efforts to restrict the decisional power of the courts
have not been limited to other branches of government. In California,
the electorate passed Proposition 115 in an attempt to require that
California's constitutional provision that parallels the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution be interpreted only as
the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth
Amendment.' And in Wisconsin, there have been constitutional
amendments that attempted to remove certain subjects from judicial
review. The most recent of these is the constitutional ban on same-sex
marriage. 2  Previously, in 1993, the Wisconsin Constitution was
amended to provide a constitutional prohibition to gambling within the
state." The initiative in California and the constitutional amendments in
Wisconsin appear to reflect a growing lack of trust of the judiciary by
the electorate. This is not a good trend. It may evidence the public's
belief that judicial independence is a myth because judges always insert
their own policy preferences into decisions.'
IV. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN WISCONSIN'S COURT SYSTEM
Wisconsin has a three-tier state court system: the circuit court, the
court of appeals, and the supreme court. In some municipalities, a
fourth tier, the municipal court, also serves the public. Most of the
philosophic discussion of judicial independence focuses on courts of last
resort, such as the United States Supreme Court or state supreme
courts. This is so, at least in Wisconsin, because it is only the supreme
court that can overrule itself or the court of appeals. However, when
comparing the three tiers of Wisconsin state courts, I note that far more
decisions are made by circuit court judges than are made by appellate
judges. We tend not to examine circuit court decisions as closely, unless
they involve high-profile cases, because they affect only the parties to
the litigation, while published appellate decisions affect us all.
30. E.g., 151 CONG. REC. E214-03 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Rep. Paul).
31. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1088 (Cal. 1990) (wherein the California
Supreme Court concluded that Proposition 115 unduly restricted judicial power and therefore
was an action not permitted by initiative).
32. WIS. CONST., art. XIII, § 13.
33. WIS. CONST., art. IV, § 24.
34. James E. Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary's Independence Myth, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1191, 1191-92 (2006).
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But query, if a supreme court justice is permitted to decide what the
constitution or a statute means based on his or her personal policy
preferences and then to define those decisions as judicially independent,
what is to prevent a circuit court judge from doing the same thing?
Most circuit court decisions are not appealed. We have approximately
241 circuit court judges in Wisconsin. Accordingly, it is possible that
Wisconsin litigants could have a very significant number of differing
opinions on the meaning of a given constitutional provision or statute if
circuit courts had decisional latitude based on each circuit court judge's
personal policy preferences.
However, few, if any, would publicly say that permitting circuit court
judges to follow their own views of what the law should be rather than
applying precedent established by the supreme court or court of appeals
is appropriate. Why is this so? In my view, this is so because few really
want a system of judicial decision making that has no rules and little if
any predictability. Nevertheless, the result of defining judicial
independence to include individual judges or courts applying their own
policy preferences to constitutional or statutory interpretation will
eventually create a system that has no readily identifiable rules. Our
judicial branch will then change from courts of law to courts of men and
women, where justice will depend upon those who occupy the seats in
the decision-making court.
V. DECISIONS WHERE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE HAS BEEN
QUESTIONED
My concerns about judicial independence are not grounded in a
liberal or a conservative philosophy because they affect all persuasions.
There are as many policy-driven decisions from the left as from the
right. Rather, my concerns are driven by a profound respect for our
judicial systems, both federal and state, and a strong belief that the
power available through judicial decision making should be reviewed
and discussed on a regular basis.
In Wisconsin, I am privileged to work with six exceptionally
dedicated men and women, some of whom may define judicial
independence differently from how I define it. I have begun this
conversation because I believe that it is necessary to the preservation of
judicial independence for courts and their members to be introspective
as to their own modes of decision making and to publicly discuss how
they believe that judicial independence relates to the people they serve.
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We need an ongoing conversation that addresses the independence
of the judiciary if we are to preserve the liberties we all cherish. If we
do not discuss it, I fear judicial independence will be nibbled off, a bit at
a time, until nothing worthwhile is left. As Mr. Justice Robert Jackson
said, "[Our] traditional freedoms are less in danger of any sudden
overthrow than of being gradually bartered or traded for something else
on which the people place a higher current value."35 Accordingly, we
must meet and converse, we must examine the work of our courts, and
we must think and write about it. For me, today is a first step toward
what I hope will be a public conversation about the meaning of judicial
independence and its preservation in Wisconsin government.
It may be helpful to explain my concerns with concrete examples.
I'd like us first to consider two opinions, Bush v. Gore6 and Dairyland
Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle,37 and lastly to consider a third opinion,
Brown v. Board of Education.38 All of the cases were decided by courts
of last resort.
Bush v. Gore was decided during the Florida recount of voting in the
2000 presidential election. In that decision, the United States Supreme
Court held that the manual recounts, as ordered by the Florida Supreme
Court, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution in regard to securing the fundamental right to vote for
President. 9 The Court explained that it so held because the Florida
court order that directed the recount process lacked specific standards
by which to discern the intent of the voters on the ballots that were
recounted. '° In so doing, the United States Supreme Court interpreted
Florida statutes contrary to the interpretation of the Florida Supreme
Court.41
Bush v. Gore's conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution was violated by the recount process has none
of the usual careful reasoning of the United States Supreme Court.
Because there was no challenge to the constitutionality of the state
statutes that were being interpreted and applied, the Court simply
35. Robert H. Jackson, The Task of Maintaining Our Liberties: The Role of the Judiciary,
39 A.B.A. J. 961, 963 (1953).
36. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
37. 2006 WI 107, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408.
38. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
39. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 103.
40. Id. at 106.
41. Id. at 120-21 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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decided that the interpretation and application of Florida statutes by the
Florida Supreme Court violated the Equal Protection Clause. 2 After
reading the per curiam opinion, which is the lead opinion, one could
wonder why the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of Florida
statutes is an erroneous interpretation.
Mr. Justice Stevens had grave concerns about the United States
Supreme Court's interpreting the Florida Code because it is most
unusual for the Court to interpret state statutes when the highest court
in the state has done so." He was also concerned because the context in
which the Court took jurisdiction was in the midst of a presidential
election." He lamented that the Court's inserting itself in the process of
recounts would be interpreted as a public statement that the United
States Supreme Court questioned the impartiality of the Florida
Supreme Court to address legal issues surrounding the recount.45
Mr. Justice Stevens may or may not have been correct to be
concerned that the United States Supreme Court would be perceived as
deciding as it did because it distrusted the Florida Supreme Court.
However, he was right to be concerned about the questions that the
decision in Bush v. Gore would raise. In regard to the issue of judicial
independence, the most significant concern that has been voiced is
whether Bush v. Gore evidences a United States Supreme Court that
has become so politicized that it is no longer an independent judiciary. 6
That concern strikes at the very heart of judicial independence, which
eschews politicization of the courts.
In Dairyland Greyhound Park, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
reviewed article IV, section 24 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which was
amended in 1993 to provide a constitutional prohibition on gambling in
Wisconsin.47 The court's review was to determine whether article IV,
section 24 applied to Indian gambling that had been legally permitted
before the amendment.4 '8 The Supreme Court did so in the context of its
42. Id. at 103 (per curiam opinion).
43. Id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 124-27.
45. Id. at 128.
46. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 2168, 2174
(2006).
47. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, 1, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 1, 719
N.W.2d 408, 1.
48. Id. 2, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 2,719 N.W.2d 408, 2.
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review of a 2001 Dane County Circuit Court case. 9 On motions for
summary judgment, the circuit court dismissed Dairyland's claim that
the 1993 amendment to article IV, section 24 prohibited the types of
casino games that had been permitted under the 1992 gaming compacts
and continued under the 1998 and 1999 compact renewals.'
Dairyland raised questions about the institutional independence of
the court because after the case reached the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
the governor asked the court to review the constitutionality of the new
casino games that were added in the 2003 compacts. Those games were
never before the circuit court, whose decision the supreme court was
reviewing for the simple reason that the 2003 compacts did not exist in
2001 when the case was brought to the circuit court. Furthermore, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court had already held in Panzer v. Doyle" that the
games added in the 2003 compacts were prohibited by article IV, section
24 of the Wisconsin Constitution, and therefore, the Indian nations'
operation of those games violated the criminal laws of Wisconsin. 2
Notwithstanding the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Panzer,
the governor publicly chose not to enforce that court decision. 3 Instead,
he repeatedly demanded that the Indian nations pay the Wisconsin
government in amounts agreed upon as a quid pro quo for the new
games and perpetual compacts negotiated in 2003.' In addition,
through the office of the attorney general, the governor asked that in
the context of the court's review of the circuit court's decision in
Dairyland that pre-dated the 2003 compacts, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court also review whether preventing the operation of the games
compacted for in 2003 violated the contracts clauses of the United States
and Wisconsin Constitutions.5
There are statutes and internal operating procedures that specify
how and when a decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court may be re-
examined, either by a motion for reconsideration to the court or by a
49. Id. if 10-13,295 Wis. 2d 1, IT 10-13,719 N.W.2d 408, I 10-13.
50. Id. 292, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 292, 719 N.W.2d 408, 292 (Roggensack, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
51. 2004 WI 52, 271 Wis. 2d 295,680 N.W.2d 666.
52. Id. I 5, 96, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 5, 96, 680 N.W.2d 666, I 5, 96.
53. Dairyland, 2006 WI 107, [ 301, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 301, 719 N.W.2d 408, 1 301
(Roggensack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
54. Id. 919[ 258-59, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 258-59, 719 N.W.2d 408, 258-59 (Prosser, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55. Id. 286-87, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 9 286-87, 719 N.W.2d 408, [ 286-87 (Roggensack, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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petition for review filed in the United States Supreme Court.56 Neither
path was taken by the governor in Panzer. Therefore, unless the issue
arose in the context of another case, the decision that the casino games
added in 2003 violated the criminal laws of Wisconsin was not subject to
further review. 7 However, notwithstanding those statutes and rules, a
majority of the court acceded to the governor's request and took up an
issue that was never before the circuit court whose decision the
Wisconsin Supreme Court was reviewing.58 In so doing, the court drew
into question its right to have the executive branch enforce its decision
in Panzer and its institutional independence from the executive branch
of government in regard to the court's own rules of procedure.59
One could assert that the decisions in Bush v. Gore and Dairyland
are policy-driven decisions, and therefore, they are no less evidence of
judicial independence, but rather, a different way of defining the
concept. I do not join that point of view. However, I will grant that
there are some policy-driven decisions that I would be compelled to
join, but they are very, very limited in type. Let me explain.
Brown v. Board of Education is one such opinion where I believe the
judiciary independently decided, on a policy basis, that separate was not
equal in public education. 6° Brown was a consolidated opinion that
addressed challenges to Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware
statutes that either permitted or required racial segregation in public
schools. 6' The segregation statutes were challenged under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.62 In defending against the challenges, it was argued that
the facilities accorded black students and white students were
substantially equal, even though the facilities were separate.63
The Court looked to the Fourteenth Amendment and concluded
that its history was unclear in regard to what may have been intended in
56. WIS. STAT. § 809.64 (2005-2006); State v. Webster, 114 Wis. 2d 418, 426 n.4, 338
N.W.2d 474, 478 n.4 (1983).
57. Dairyland, IT 286-87, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 286-87, 719 N.W.2d 408, 11 286-87
(Roggensack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58. Id. IT 286-87,295 Wis. 2d 1, 286-87, 719 N.W.2d 408, 91 286-87 (Roggensack, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
59. Id. IT 286-87,295 Wis. 2d 1, IT 286-87, 719 N.W.2d 408, 286-87.
60. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
61. Id. at 486.
62. Id. at 488.
63. Id.
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regard to public education" It then looked to the effect of segregation
on public education.6 The Court reasoned that by prohibiting one race
from attending a public school that was open to another race, the state
law denoted that the excluded race was inferior, which could cause a
failure to learn in the excluded children.' This, the Court concluded,
caused separate but equal public schools to deny the children of the
minority group equal educational opportunities.6 ' Because education
was so necessary to the development of a citizen who could fully
participate, a restriction on public education was held to be violative of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.68
Brown is certainly policy-driven. However, for me, the decision in
Brown was correct because the value underlying the Supreme Court's
analysis was not confined to education. Rather, it was the universal
value that all men and women, no matter their race, are equal under the
laws of the United States. Stated otherwise, the value at stake in Brown
transcended the legal issue, whether separate but equal public education
violated the United States Constitution, on which the Court's decision
turned.
VI. To CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION
I have tried to set out some of the issues that underlie an
examination of judicial independence, and to some degree, I have given
you my take on them. However, this is a conversation where I recognize
that there are many points of view on this very important subject. I'd
like to hear your thoughts about judicial independence. So let us begin.
64. Id. at 489-90.
65. Id. at 492-93.
66. Id. at 494.
67. Id. at 493.
68. Id. at 495.
* * *
